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A WELFARE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS: THE TRIUMPH OF
THE THERAPEUTIC IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Daniel F. Piar*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the influence of the therapeutic culture on the modem
constitutional law of civil rights. The therapeutic culture is defined as one in which
the central moral question is individual fulfillment. That culture has sprung up to
replace older cultures such as Protestantism and classical republicanism, which are
no longer capable of appealing to a nation as diverse as the United States. Instead of
asking whether individuals or the nation conform to some external moral system, the
therapeutic culture asks whether individuals are happy or fulfilled. This Article demon-
strates that the therapeutic culture has had a significant effect on the constitutional
law of civil rights. Drawing on an interdisciplinary approach, including history,
sociology, and law, it offers a reading of some of the most important civil rights cases
of the last hundred years to demonstrate how concepts of personal fulfillment, such
as emotional comfort and psychic integrity, have been used to draw the boundaries
of state action and declare the meaning of the Constitution. While this development
has led to the recognition of many new rights, it also poses threats to liberties that are
endemic to the therapeutic culture. These include the aggrandizement of state author-
ity in the name of therapy and the danger of dependence on the courts rather than
ourselves as agents of therapeutic change.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important features of the last century of American law has been
the growing role of the courts in policing civil rights. From the early days of due
process through the Warren Court's "rights revolution" to the most recent line of cases
extending concepts of personal autonomy, the courts have consistently expanded the
reach of law by defining and enforcing new rights.' Various explanations have been
offered for this "rights explosion." Some point to the success of the desegregation
movement in the courts, which inspired confidence in lawsuits as a means of
* Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta; J.D., Yale Law School;
A.B., Harvard College. The phrase "triumph of the therapeutic" is borrowed from Philip Rieff.
Thanks to Diona Potter for her able research assistance and to Morteza Parvin of the John
Marshall Law Library for his invaluable help in obtaining materials.
' See infra Part II.
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vindicating civil rights.2 Others suggest that dissatisfaction with the slow pace of
representative politics has made the courts a more attractive alternative for those
seeking protection or redress.3 Still others note that the proliferation of lawyers and
the adversarial trend of America's legal culture have glorified litigation above the
political arts of legislation and compromise. And it has been pointed out that the
Fourteenth Amendment has accelerated the growth of rights law by expanding the
federal power of judicial review.
There is truth in all these accounts, and a phenomenon as complex as the rights
explosion surely demands more than one explanation. But one of the most impor-
tant explanations, which has been largely overlooked, is the connection between the
modem law of civil rights and the American therapeutic culture. Over the last century,
therapeutic ideals have permeated American life, and the law has not been immune.6
Both the content of rights law and its increasingly broad scope can be seen as direct
responses to the demands of the culture for therapeutic government. Understanding
this connection can give us a greater appreciation of the ways in which culture in-
fluences law and of the rewards and the risks of the present direction of both law and
society.
The therapeutic culture has been studied by historians, sociologists, and other
observers since at least the 1960s. Briefly defined, it is a culture in which the central
question is the fulfillment of the individual rather than the individual's compliance
with collective goals or moral authority outside the self.7 In this it departs from older
cultural paradigms such as Protestantism, classical republicanism, and Lockean liber-
alism, all of which tended to treat the self as less important than the moral or civic
order.8 In the therapeutic culture, the self is the moral order, and the development
or happiness of the self is among the highest goals of society. In its simplest form,
the therapeutic culture looks to doctors to treat and heal individuals. But therapy has
escaped the psychiatrist's couch to permeate modem life: it appears in the work-
place, where employers are expected to safeguard the emotional well-being of their
employees;9 in schools, which are expected to do the same for their students;' ° in
entertainment, as evidenced by the popularity of figures such as Oprah and Dr. Phil;"
2 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmcALDISCOURSE
5-7 (1991).
3 Id.; ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
45-46 (2001).
4 KAGAN, supra note 3, at 55-56.
5 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 4-5.
6 See infra Part I.
7 See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT
AT CENruRY's END 2-5 (1998).
8 Id. at 27-36.
9 See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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and even in one's relationship with oneself, as shown by the bourgeoning genre of
self-help literature. 12
Most importantly for our purposes, therapy is also sought from government, a
phenomenon that has directly influenced the development of modem civil rights law.
The American state has long been in the business of providing material aid to its
citizens, from subsidized housing to medical care to food stamps. 3 It has also been
clear for some time that the state is in the business of providing--or requiring-
therapy. Many of the same welfare programs that provide food, shelter, and clothing
also seek to provide mental or emotional aid. 4 The criminal justice system has fre-
quently taken on the task of therapy as well as punishment, as in programs of coun-
seling for drug, domestic violence, and drunk driving offenders. 5 The juvenile and
domestic court systems are dedicated to the therapeutic oversight of young delinquents
and family relationships. 6 And in the civil courts, emotional wholeness has become
an interest protected by tort law.17 There is an entire government apparatus dedicated
to fostering and fixing the self, an emotional parallel to the longer-standing forms of
physical government aid.
In this context, it is not surprising that the therapeutic ethic should also play a role
in the law of civil rights. The major rights decisions of the past century have increas-
ingly adopted the rhetoric of therapy in determining the content of individual liberties
and the scope of constitutional law. In a series of landmark cases, the Supreme Court
has analyzed legal problems in light of therapeutic concerns, and in this process the
boundaries of state power have repeatedly been set with reference to the emotional,
spiritual, or psychic needs of the citizenry. As early as 1943, the Court identified "a
right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal
attitude"' 8 and forbade government to trespass on "the sphere of intellect and spirit."' 9
A decade later the Court struck down school segregation on the grounds that it
"generates a feeling of inferiority" detrimental to minority schoolchildren. 20 The
'2 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
" Contrary to popular belief, intensive government regulation dates back to the early
nineteenth century. See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (discussing the pervasiveness of
government regulation in nineteenth-century America).
'4 ANDREW J. POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE THERAPEUTIC STATE 4 (1991).
15 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 292-96.
16 EVA S. MOSKOWrrz, IN THERAPY WE TRUST: AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH SELF-
FULFILLMENT 72-75 (2001).
17 Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11, 18-21 (1983) ("Tort law has undergone a relaxation of rules
that formerly prohibited recovery for purely emotional or psychic injury, a doctrinal evolution
that parallels the growth of the 'me-generation."').
"8 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
'9 Id. at 642.
20 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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Court went on to develop an "endorsement test" for Establishment Clause cases,
which bars government action that makes people feel like "outsiders, not full members
of the political community."'" It has struck down school prayer that causes non-
believing students to feel "offense," "isolation," and "affront. '22 It has disallowed
regulation that it sees as interfering with "the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 23 And it has
emphasized that legally protected liberty must be understood not only in the "spatial"
dimensions of bodily freedom, but also in the "more transcendent dimensions" of
spiritual autonomy.24 These and other cases discussed below illustrate the degree to
which concepts of therapy have come to determine the content of civil rights law.
The capture of law by the therapeutic culture is a remarkable occurrence. If the
life of the law once was reason, logic, or experience, it is now good feeling, individual
fulfillment, and therapeutic healing. This represents a profound shift in both culture
and law, the consequences of which have yet to be fully appreciated. This triumph of
the therapeutic has transformed the role of law in American life in ways both hopeful
and dangerous. One result of the therapeutic approach to civil rights has been to
expand the roster of constitutionally protected liberties, making the modem age osten-
sibly one of great personal freedom.25 But such freedom has its price, for the thera-
peutic culture ironically risks fostering dependence in the name of self-fulfillment.
The very term "therapeutic" implies that the self is fragile, or ill, and that some form
of healing is needed. The individual, by definition emotionally or spiritually weak,
must rely on the ministrations of some therapeutic authority for complete fulfillment.
Whether that authority is a physician, a counselor, a government program, or a
court, the therapeutic enterprise is frequently founded on dependence, not autonomy.
Therapy often presumes weakness, not strength; submission, not self-determination;
compliance, not independence. Thus, while we may justly celebrate our individual
freedoms, we should be mindful that the therapeutic dependence on the courts risks
the atrophy of our faculties of self-determination, just as the therapeutic culture in
general jeopardizes the American ideal of self-reliance.
I. THE THERAPEUTIC CULTURE AND THE THERAPEUTIC STATE
Before discussing the effect of the therapeutic ethic on law, it will be helpful to
trace the growth and characteristics of this distinctive phase of American culture. The
principal catalyst of the therapeutic culture has been the decline of older cultures that
once governed American life, in particular Protestantism, classical republicanism, and
21 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
23 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
24 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
25 See infra Part II.
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Lockean liberalism. 26 Of these, the decline of Protestantism is perhaps the most impor-
tant because it had been a dominant presence in American society for most of the
nineteenth century, ordering law, political relations, and private life to an extraordinary
degree.27 But like Christian cultures throughout the west, American Protestantism
did not survive unscathed into modem times. By the early twentieth century, the
homogeneity of ethnicity, temperament, and belief that had kept Protestantism in the
fore was passing from the scene. Increased immigration introduced new groups with
diverse goals and ideas, not all of which could be assimilated into the Protestant
culture.28 Urbanization and industrialization threw the new cultures together with
the old in ways that made it impossible to contain their mutual influence.29 Darwinism,
scientific rationalism, and the shocks of the Civil and First World Wars combined to
shake a society's collective faith. The rise of capitalism shifted cultural priorities from
spiritual satisfaction to the production and consumption of goods, further displacing
religion as a culturally unifying force.3 ° As the culture changed, increasingly rigid
legal doctrines of separation of church and state began formally to excise religion from
public life and law. 3' By the first decades of the twentieth century, American culture
was nearing the end of what Philip Rieff calls "[t]he long period of deconversion" from
Christianity, 32 or what Robert Handy has termed "The Second Disestablishment.,
33
In a nation filled with diverse voices clamoring for diverse wants, in a society that
26 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 27-36.
27 See generally ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND
HISTORICAL REALrrIEs (1971) (discussing Protestants' effects on American civilization);
MARTIN E. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1970)
(discussing the history of American Protestants and the Protestant experience in America);
Daniel F. Piar, Majority Rights, Minority Freedoms: Protestant Culture, PersonalAutonomy,
and Civil Liberties in Nineteenth-Century America, 14 WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 987,992-98
(2006) (describing the dominant effects of Protestant culture and beliefs on nineteenth-century
American culture and society).
28 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 18-19.
29 Id.; T. J. Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the
Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930, in THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION:
CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at 1, 6-7 (Richard Wightman Fox &
T. J. Jackson Lears, eds., 1983).
30 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 2-3; Lears, supra note 29, at 3-6.
31 See NOLAN, supra note 7, at 36-37; Piar, supra note 27, at 1021; H. Frank Way, The
Death of the Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State Relations, 29 J. CHURCH &
ST. 509 (1987). For a detailed study of both legal and cultural demands for separation in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OFCHURCH
AND STATE 285-478 (2002).
32 PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 2
(1966).
" HANDY, supra note 27, at 184. The same factors that undermined Protestant culture
also contributed to the decline of classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism. See NOLAN,
supra note 7, at 27-39.
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increasingly glorified the competition inherent in capitalist markets, in a world experi-
encing the shock of large-scale warfare and the challenge to faith posed by new forms
of science, the voices in the sky seemed to have fallen silent. The Virgin gave way
to the Dynamo. 4 This is not to say that private religiosity disappeared, but it is to say
that religion gradually lost much of its power to explain the world and ceased to be
a widespread or even an acceptable form of shared public discourse.
With the decline of the older moral systems, the therapeutic culture emerged as
a replacement. The therapeutic culture is one in which the central moral issue is not
surrender to some higher authority or collective goal, but rather the fulfillment of the
self.36 As Warren Susman has observed, "The vision of self-sacrifice began to yield
to that of self-realization. There was fascination with the peculiarities of the self, espe-
cially the sick self.",37 Phillip Rieff wrote in his seminal book, The Triumph of the
Therapeutic, that the "self, improved, is the ultimate concern of modern culture. 38
More recently, Lawrence Friedman has summarized some of the major traits of the
therapeutic ethic:
In our individualistic age the state, the legal system, and orga-
nized society in general thus seem more and more dedicated to
one fundamental goal: to permit, foster, and protect the self, the
person, the individual. A basic social creed justifies this aim:
each person ... ought to have the right to create or build up a
way of life for ourselves, and to do it through free, open, and un-
trammeled choice. These are the unspoken premises of popular
culture.39
This new cultural paradigm, like the decline of the old ones, was an outgrowth of the
altered conditions of modern America. Made anxious by the pace of change in the
3' The metaphor is Henry Adams's. See HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OFHENRY ADAMS:
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 379-90 (1918); see also NOLAN, supra note 7, at 2-3, 18-19, 37.
31 Moreover, in modem times even the private exercise of religion seems to have been
co-opted by its replacement, the therapeutic culture. There are indications that religion is
frequently pursued for the sake of therapeutic self-development rather than surrender to higher
moral authority. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAHET AL., HABrrs OFTHE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 63-65, 232-33 (1st California Paperback ed. 1996);
FRANK FUREDI, THERAPY CULTURE: CULTIVATING VULNERABILITY IN AN UNCERTAIN AGE
17-18 (2004).
36 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
3 WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 276 (1984).
38 RIEFF, supra note 32, at 62.
39 LAwRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE
8-9 (1990).
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world around them,' and already disposed toward individualism, Americans increas-
ingly turned to self-fulfillment as the answer to the challenges of modern life:
Plagued by anxiety, depression, vague discontents, a sense of
inner emptiness, the "psychological man" of the twentieth century
seeks neither individual self-aggrandizement nor spiritual tran-
scendence but peace of mind, under conditions that increasingly
militate against it. Therapists, not priests or popular preachers
of self-help or models of success like the captains of industry,
become his principal allies in the struggle for composure; he
turns to them in the hope of achieving the modern equivalent of
salvation, "mental health." Therapy has established itself as the
successor both to rugged individualism and to religion .... "
Unlike the older paradigms, the therapeutic ethic was compatible with the increasing
heterogeneity of American society because it drew no distinctions based on race,
ethnicity, class, or religion.42 It dovetailed perfectly with the capitalist consumer
culture, which likewise focused on personal desire and its satisfaction.43 And by
promising health, happiness, and well-being, it offered a seductive appeal instead of
making the sometimes inconvenient demands of other, older moral systems.
This shift from external morality to inner fulfillment, from religion to therapy,
marks a major change in American culture. If Protestant man had asked, "Am I
saved?" or "Are we a Godly nation?," therapeutic man asks, "Am I happy?" or "Am
I the best person I can be?" Thus, by contrast to earlier times, "modern man now
appears ready to attempt a life built upon no other ideal than happiness: comfort and
self-expression." 44 In Rieff's summation, 'That a sense of well-being has become the
end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end, announces
a fundamental change of focus in the entire cast of our culture."
45
0 One source offers a persuasive account of "American nervousness" as a major catalyst
of the therapeutic culture. See BELLAHETAL., supra note 35, at 117-21. Jackson Lears likewise
points to a widespread sense of unreality and self-doubt in nineteenth-century life as laying the
groundwork for the rise of the therapeutic ethic. See Lears, supra note 29, at 3-17; see also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 2-3.
41 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 13 (Warner Books ed. 1979).
42 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 19.
13 Lears's work shows how consumer capitalism both grew from and reinforced the
therapeutic ethic. See Lears, supra note 29.
44 JOHN H. SCHAAR, LEGIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 15, 32 (1981); see also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 8.
4' RIEFF, supra note 32, at 261.
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Evidence of what Rieff dubbed "the triumph of the therapeutic"4 can readily
be found in modem America.4 7 The consumer culture has built an entire economy
on the creation and satisfaction of personal desire.48 Advertising seizes on people's
innermost desires-to be happier, healthier, prettier, better-regarded-and uses these
therapeutic susceptibilities to push products.4 9 In popular culture, an immense pub-
lishing industry has sprung up to satisfy the demand for therapy, as a visit to the
"self-help" or "recovery" sections of any major bookstore will show. 0 Television
shows such as The Oprah Winfrey Show and Dr. Phil cater to the therapeutic ethic by
offering story after story about self-improvement and personal well-being.5' The title
of one of Dr. Phil's best-selling books is emblematic: Self Matters.2
The medical and counseling professions are another central part of the therapeutic
culture. To aid people in pursuing therapeutic wellness, twelve-step programs abound,
and new psychological "syndromes" are diagnosed to explain a variety of unwanted
behaviors 3.5 The number of Americans who have consulted mental health profes-
sionals has risen dramatically, from around fourteen percent of the population in the
1960s to well over half by the dawn of the twenty-first century.54 The pursuit of good
feeling through drugs such as Prozac has become part of everyday life, to such a degree
that a new term, "cosmetic psychopharmacology," has been coined to describe it.55
In the news media, reaction to public events often reflects the prevailing concern
with therapy. When actor Mel Gibson uttered an anti-Semitic remark during a drunk-
driving arrest, the news was filled with demands for his rehabilitation, discussion of
the emotional wounds he had caused, and the offender's contrite admission that he was
46 Id. at 243.
47 See NOLAN, supra note 7, at 19. For a detailed survey, see MOSKOWrrZ, supra note 16,
at 1-9.
48 See generally GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM
WON IN MODERN AMERICA (2000) (discussing the historic influence of commercialism in
America).
'9 Lears, supra note 29, at 18-19.
50 MOSKOWTZ, supra note 16, at 1, 245.
51 Id. at 260-69. On Winfrey's methods and influence, see Christopher John Farley, Queen
ofAll Media, TIME, Oct. 5, 1998, at 82; Lee Siegel, The Strange Genius of Oprah: Thank You
for Sharing, THENEW REPUBLIC, June 5 & 12, 2006, at 19. On those of McGraw, see Michelle
Cottle, The Bad Doctor: Daddy Knows, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 2004-Jan. 10, 2005,
at 19; Marc Peyser, Paging Doctor Phil, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2, 2002, at 50.
52 PHILIP C. McGRAw, SELF MATrERS: CREATING YOUR LIFE FROM THE INSIDE OUT
(2003).
53 MOSKOwrrz, supra note 16, at 5, 257-59.
54 FUREDI, supra note 35, at 9.
51 PETERD. KRAMER, LISTENINGTOPROZAC, at xvi (1993). For more on the rise of psycho-
pharmacology, see RONALD W. DWORKIN, ARTIFICIAL HAPPINESS: THE DARK SIDE OF THE
NEW HAPPY CLASS 2-3, 33-35 (2006); DAVID HEALY, THE ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA (1997).
For a journalistic look at the widespread use of mood-altering drugs, see Ariel Levy, Pill
Culture Pops, N.Y. MAG., June 9, 2003, at 24.
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ill and needed help.56 One wire service quoted Gibson as seeking "the appropriate
path for healing" those he had hurt; that quote was coupled with an offer by a Jewish
leader to "help him with his.., rehabilitation to combat this disease of prejudice. 57
After Congressman Mark Foley resigned in the wake of allegations that he was a
pedophile, he issued successive statements acknowledging his homosexuality, con-
fessing his alcoholism, and alleging that he had been the victim of childhood sexual
abuse at the hands of a priest.58 In reporting these stories, it was not sufficient merely
to note that Gibson might be a bigot or that Foley may have engaged in sexually sus-
pect behavior-newsworthy as those facts might have been. Full coverage now
requires the exploration of the therapeutic aspects of events, including the emotional,
psychological, and pathological dimensions of offenders and victims.
The cultural yen for therapy has led Americans to demand it and to provide it in
a surprising variety of contexts. Public education, for example, is now designed as
much to foster self-esteem and positive mental outlooks as to impart knowledge or
discipline.59 In the workplace, employers are often expected to meet their employees'
emotional needs as well as their need for a paycheck. Employee assistance programs,
which provide emotional counseling, are an increasingly common part of employee
benefits packages. 60 Workplace training in diversity awareness and sensitivity to
others has become standard fare in many companies.6' In response to workplace
disasters, employers are often called upon to address the emotional impact of events
upon their employees. For example, a recent news story reported an attack on five
pedestrians in the parking lot of a fast-food restaurant. 62 The story related that while
the police were investigating the crime, the employer was providing counseling for
its employees who had witnessed the event. 63 In Seattle, where an urban bridge has
become a site of frequent suicides, employers regularly provide counseling for em-
ployees who witness the tragic events from nearby office buildings.64 Sometimes
therapy is extended to customers or their families. In the wake of a recent airplane
56 See, e.g., Associated Press, Gibson Admits Remarks, Says He's Not a Bigot, Aug. 1,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14135464/.
57 Id.
58 Abby Goodnough, Foley Was Sexually Abused as a Youth, His Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2006, at A26.
" See NoLAN, supra note 7, at 150-81 (discussing the role of the therapeutic ethos in
American public education).
6' See, e.g., Tyler D. Hartwell et al., Aiding Troubled Employees: The Prevalence, Cost,
and Characteristics of Employee Assistance Programs in the United States, 86 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 804 (1996).
61 NoLAN, supra note 7, at 293-95.
62 Associated Press, Smiling Driver Runs over Five People, CHARLESTON GAzETrE
(Charleston, W. Va.), May 24, 2006, at 4C.
63 Id.
64 Donna Gordon Blankinship, Bridge Suicides Unnerve Seattle, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26,
2007, at 2.
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crash in Kentucky, for instance, the airline's reaction included not only cooperating
with safety officials and assessing what went wrong, but also providing therapy for
the bereaved through airline-sponsored "care teams," groups of workers who would
assist the victims' families with everything from travel arrangements to mental health
care.65 The presence of therapy in such diverse settings further illustrates the hold
that therapeutic ideals have on our culture. Taken together, these and many other
examples that could be cited show that therapy has replaced religion as a common
language of American society.
The therapeutic ethic has also had an enormous impact on the scope and character
of the American state. Not only have Americans sought therapy from employers,
schools, and the media, but they have also sought it from government.' In his com-
prehensive study of the therapeutic state, James Nolan sees this as a response to our
modem "legitimation deficit., 67 If government can no longer claim to be ordained
by God or supported by traditional civic paradigms, then it must justify itself by our
new cultural standard of therapy. 68 This has led to state-sponsored therapeutic inter-
vention in a wide variety of human affairs. A battery of social welfare programs seek
"to give recipients better psychological tools and stronger emotional resources."'69
These "include juvenile courts, child welfare departments, vocational rehabilitation
and training centers, shelters for the homeless, community mental health programs,
public assistance departments, chemical dependency treatment clinics, shelters for
battered women, and Veterans' Administration services," not to mention privately
contracted support services paid for by public money.70 "All told," writes Andrew
Polsky, "the number of persons brought under the domain of [this] human service
apparatus ranges into the millions.' Consequently, as Robert Nagel has pointed out,
"It is now widely taken for granted that the central government is responsible not
only for material welfare but also for psychic gratification. 72
As the state has become enmeshed in the therapeutic culture, there has been an
increasing reliance on the courts as agents of therapy. In the criminal justice system,
drug courts commonly allow offenders to avoid imprisonment in exchange for com-
pleting programs of treatment and rehabilitation.73 In such cases, the traditionally
65 Sharon Thompson & Barbara Isaacs, Area Support Services Offer Help Amid Loss,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 29, 2006, at A6.
66 See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 7, at 219-20 (discussing the effect of the therapeutic ethos
on welfare policy).
67 Id. at 27.
68 See id. at 45.
69 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 4.
70 id.
71 id.
72 ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 140 (2001) (citing
NOLAN, supra note 7).
73 See generally NOLAN, supra note 7, at 78-112 (discussing drug courts and their role
in the criminal justice system).
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authoritarian roles of judges, prosecutors, and probation officers are frequently relaxed
into a personalized, helping approach that looks more like caretaking than the usual
administration of justice.74 Prisons, institutions once devoted to punishment and
incapacitation, now attempt healing and reform through programs of counseling and
training.75 In drunk-driving cases, alcohol treatment and counseling are standard
requirements, whether or not an offender is clinically an alcoholic.76
The civil courts have also turned increasingly to the therapeutic. The juvenile and
domestic courts administer justice with deliberate attention to the emotional, psychic,
and therapeutic dynamics of family problems." In civil litigation, the courts more
readily accept mental health professionals as expert witnesses, a development that
reflects the general rise in the status of psychology and psychiatry as key parts of the
therapeutic culture.78 Tort law has responded to therapeutic ideals by recognizing
emotional injury as a basis for damages.79 In the context of libel law, Rodney Smolla
describes this change as affording "new legal shelter for mental and emotional calm"
in an effort to protect "psychic equanimity., 80 The law, like the rest of American
culture, has become dedicated to guarding and fostering the self.
81
Within this changed legal landscape, the therapeutic culture has had a profound
effect on the law of civil rights. While the nineteenth century shaped its rights law
based on Protestant values such as individual moral autonomy or classic republican
values such as personal responsibility, modern rights law has turned to therapeutic
concepts of personal fulfillment and psychic comfort to determine what state action
is and is not permissible. Part II will trace these developments through a series of
landmark Supreme Court decisions of the past century to show how thoroughly our
modem legal concepts of rights have been influenced by the therapeutic culture.
II. THERAPY IN THE LAW OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The therapeutic culture began to influence civil rights law most strongly in the
1940s and 1950s, but to fully appreciate its emergence we should glance backward
at the prevailing legal culture of the nineteenth century, as well as the changing legal
conditions of the early decades of the twentieth.
I have written elsewhere on the connections between the nineteenth-century
Protestant culture and the law of civil rights. 82 To summarize briefly, that culture
74 Id. at 91-98.
71 Id. at 112-27.
76 Id. at 292-93.
77 MoSKowrrlz, supra note 16, at 72-75; POLSKY, supra note 14, at 80-81.
78 See NOLAN, supra note 7, at 68-72.
71 See id. at 46-68.
80 Smolla, supra note 17, at 20-21.
81 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 8-9.
82 See Piar, supra note 27.
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viewed individuals as morally autonomous and morally capable, especially when it
came to matters of spirituality and internal being.83 This meant that the law typically
was not viewed as playing a role in protecting the emotional or psychic states of indi-
viduals because that was something individuals were expected to do for themselves.'
Consequently, claims of right based on personal belief, such as attacks on Sunday
closing laws, school prayer laws, or blasphemy laws, were typically rebuffed by the
courts, who saw the maintenance of self in the face of legal handicaps as the respon-
sibility of the individual.8 5 This approach naturally limited the role of law in public
life, as the courts declined to extend their powers to entire categories of civil rights
claims.86
The transition to a therapeutic view of rights law began to emerge most clearly
near the dawn of the twentieth century. An early indicator was Warren and Brandeis's
famous 1890 article on the right to privacy, in which they wrote that the "recognition
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect," should trigger new legal
protection for "[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations. 87 Although the Supreme Court
did not immediately accept the invitation, around this time it began a process that
would lead it to base large swaths of civil rights law on precisely these internal con-
siderations. It should be noted that the centrality of the Supreme Court to this pro-
cess was something new. Most nineteenth-century rights litigation took place in the
state courts, as the Fourteenth Amendment had either not been passed or was not yet
viewed as allowing federal courts to oversee the laws of the states. 88 But in the
closing decades of the century, as the law of the Fourteenth Amendment matured,
the federal courts took a more active role in policing state activities. Naturally, the
Supreme Court led the way and thus began a consolidation of judicial power that
would make it easy for the Court to steer law as it--or the culture of which it was
a part-saw fit.
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court showed a willingness to place
the imperatives of the individual above the commands of positive law, a development
that laid the groundwork for the advent of the therapeutic approach a few decades
later. One of the earliest cases in this transition was Lochner v. New York. 89 Lochner
involved a challenge to a New York state law limiting the hours of employment for
bakers.90 The law was a progressive public-welfare act designed to protect laborers
from fatigue, exposure to harmful substances such as flour dust, and (most likely)
83 Id. at 988.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 989.
86 Id. at 990.
87 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
193, 195 (1890).
88 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
89 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
90 Id. at 68-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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exploitation by over-demanding employers. 9' Nonetheless, the Court struck down
the law as a violation of the employer's right to buy labor and the employee's right
to sell it: "The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.... The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected
by this amendment .... 92 Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent, criticized the Court
for subverting a rational exercise of legislative power, thereby preventing "the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion." 93 And, of course, later commentators have savaged
the decision as an example of judicial overreaching and reactionary politics.94
Lochner is an easy target if it is read as an ode to laissez-faire capitalism, but it
can more sensitively be read as an ode to individual autonomy. If a baker wants to
breathe flour dust for more than ten hours each day, why should he be prevented from
doing so? If he decides that it is in his best interest to work more than sixty hours
per week in front of hot ovens, who is the government to oppose him? As the Court
asked rhetorically,
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbi-
trary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of
himself and his family? 9
5
Lochner is important because of the degree to which it favored the individual in this
balance, even though it now seems apparent to most that the state's action was both
reasonable and beneficial to those affected. Thus, Lochner remains useful not for its
holding, but as an early example of the twentieth-century placement of individual rights
at the center of the constitutional scheme. From here, it would be a fairly short step
to enlisting law to protect the individual's psyche in addition to his contractual liberty.
The work begun in Lochner continued as the century unfolded. In Meyer v.
Nebraska, decided eighteen years later, the Court struck down a state law barring the
teaching of German to schoolchildren.96 The narrow basis for the opinion was that
the Due Process Clause gave parents the right "to control the education of their own,"
which meant that the state could not bar the teaching of a foreign language if the
9' Id. at 69-72.
92 Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
9' Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677 (2005).
9' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (majority opinion).
96 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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parents wished it.97 But the Court went further by positing a broader sphere of due
process rights, encompassing "the right of the individual... generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men."9 8 The Court did not purport to list all of those rights, which meant
that the concept of due process was apparently to be open-ended and defined by the
judiciary as cases arose. The individual was becoming increasingly important as an
object ofjudicial attention, and his "pursuit of happiness" was becoming ajudicially
enforceable goal. These were further indications that the therapeutic culture was
taking hold in the law.
Lochner and Meyer showed that the Court would protect what might be called
behavioral liberty-the right of persons to engage in particular kinds of conduct. But
just a few years later, in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis showed that it
was possible to think of law as affording emotional protection, even in the unexpected
context of a criminal appeal. 99 In dissenting from the majority's affirmation of a
conviction based on wiretap evidence, he explained:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. 10
Feelings, emotions, and sensations are not the usual stuff of criminal adjudication.
And Brandeis, of course, was writing in dissent. But his reliance on the interior realm
as a measure of state action was a portent of things to come.
Fifteen years after Olmstead, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Court came around to Brandeis's view by defining individual liberty
in psychic as well as physical terms. 0 ' Barnette involved a challenge by a group of
parents to a state law requiring that schoolchildren salute the United States flag each
day while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.' 0 2 The parents, who were Jehovah's
Witnesses, claimed that the flag salute required obeisance to a graven image, which
97 Id. at401.
98 Id. at 399.
99 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"o Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
101 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
102 Id. at 626-29.
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offended their religion. °3 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, bypassed the ob-
vious First Amendment freedom of religion claim to phrase the issue in terms of state
power versus internal autonomy: "The sole conflict is between authority and rights
of the individual," he wrote." The plaintiffs "stand on a right of self-determination
in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude."' ' Stated this way, the
debate was over as soon as it began. "[T]he Bill of Rights," Jackson wrote, was based
on the assumption that "the individual was the center of society."'" The flag-salute
law ran afoul of this priority by requiring "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind,"'0 7 thereby trespassing on a realm that was beyond government interference.
"[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein .... [This law] invades the sphere of intellect and spirit 0. ,1 8
Accordingly, the Court declared the law unconstitutional.' °9
Barnette marks an important moment in the law of individual rights because it
expanded the idea of constitutionally protectable autonomy from the external realm
of conduct, found in Lochner and Meyer, to the internal realm of thought, feeling, and
"spirit." The significance of this change was reflected in Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent, which looked back to the older, "external" concept of rights law to criticize the
majority's result. °"0 To Frankfurter, the decision made no sense because the realm
of "intellect and spirit" referenced by the majority could not be reached even under
the law as it stood."' Surely, he wrote, a child could stand and recite the Pledge with-
out believing what it said, or while harboring internal reservations. " 2 Likewise, the
child's parents remained free to teach the child that the Pledge was wrong or to take
other steps to instill their own beliefs. 13 There was nothing in the case to indicate that
the state had changed anyone's mind by requiring the flag salute or that children were
being brainwashed instead of merely being required to participate in an exercise in
which they might not believe. On this view, the state's sin lay not in mind control but
in endorsing a position that a minority might find disagreeable, which was generally
not a matter for judicial involvement."14
'03 Id. at 629.
'04 Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
'06 Id. at 639.
107 Id. at 633.
"' Id. at 642.
1o9 Id.
"o See id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Law is concerned with external behavior
and not with the inner life of man.").
"' Id. at 664.
112 See id. ("Saluting the flag suppresses no belief nor curbs it.").
113 See id.
"' See id. at 662.
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Frankfurter's view likely would have carried the day in the nineteenth century,
but things were changing. According to the majority, the Constitution would safe-
guard the autonomy of the individual, which now appeared to be spiritual as well as
physical. Barnette thus suggested a right to some sort of psychic integrity free from
influence or even disturbance by government. This premise marked a significant step
toward a therapeutic view of civil rights, as the Court began to make the mental and
spiritual states of individuals a touchstone of constitutional law.
Later cases would build upon this growing commitment to law as a tool for
therapeutic regulation. Brown v. Board of Education 15 is a landmark in this process.
The plaintiffs' lawyers in Brown based their case in large part on a claim that segre-
gation did psychological damage to its victims." 6 Their strategy worked, and the
Court adopted the language of therapy in rejecting the concept of "separate but equal"
in public education." 7 In perhaps the most famous passage of the opinion, the Court
relied on therapeutic concepts to effect a sea change in American law: "To separate
[schoolchildren] from others.., solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone.""' 8 This statement was a telling indication of the
Court's commitment to law as a therapeutic tool, for there were other grounds on
which the Court could have decided the case. It could have held that separation was
inherently unequal, as it had begun to hint at in earlier cases addressing segregated
higher education." 9 It could have held that intentional segregation was barred be-
cause the Reconstruction Amendments were meant to protect blacks from just such
oppression, following the Slaughter-House Cases2° and Justice Harlan's famous dis-
sents in Plessy v. Ferguson2' and the Civil Rights Cases.12 2 Or it could have held that
intentional segregation was one of the "badges and incidents of slavery" that could
be banished by Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment. 23 Instead, it linked the
"1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
116 For a detailed account of the development of this theory, see MOSKOWrTZ, supra note
16, at 179-92.
"' See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
118 Id.
" See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Was Brown's Declaration of Per Se Invalidity Really Out of the
Blue? The Evolving "Separate but Equal" Education Jurisprudence from Cumming to Brown,
47 How. L.J. 769 (2004).
120 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
121 163 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122 109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Patrick J. Kelley, An
Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75
(1995).
123 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 440 (1968). For other explorations of possible bases for the Brown opinion, see
JACK M. BALKjN ET AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(2001).
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constitutional violation to emotional well-being. "The sin of segregation," Lawrence
Friedman wrote in assessing the Court's approach, "was its failure to allow full devel-
opment of the souls of black children., 124 This approach made explicit Barnette's
implication that law was to be a tool for safeguarding psychic wellness, not merely
ensuring freedom of action.125 As Eva Moskowitz has observed, "Never before had
the constitutionality of a government policy turned upon the feelings it engendered." 26
But if Brown was the first such case, it was far from the last.
A decade after Brown, the Court expanded its use of therapeutic ideas to include
the emerging right of privacy. In a 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
relied on general considerations of privacy and the dignity of marriage to invalidate
a state ban on contraceptive use by married couples. 27 A few years later, reviewing
a Massachusetts law banning such use by unmarried couples, the Court referred to indi-
vidual emotional needs as well as privacy considerations in striking down the law:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 2
8
Although the Court was not more specific as to the precise role of one's "intellectual
and emotional makeup" in the civil rights calculus, its reference to these factors, and
its quotation of Brandeis's Olmstead dissent, portended an important role for such
concerns in the emerging right of privacy.
That role was fully realized the following year in Roe v. Wade. 29 The opinion
has been criticized for being vague about its legal sources, though it seemed ultimately
to turn on the general concept of substantive due process. 30 Whatever its legal theory,
though, the decision owed much to therapeutic ideals. Writing for the Court, Justice
124 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 63.
125 See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
126 MOSKOWrrZ, supra note 16, at 189.
127 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
128 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). The Court then quoted Justice Brandeis's
dissent in Olmstead, discussed supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453 n.10.
129 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
130 The classic critique is John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf." A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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Blackmun made clear that the mental and emotional burdens of maternity were a
major factor in striking down the law:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice [of abortion] altogether is ap-
parent.... Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may
be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. '31
Here, as in Brown, emotional distress, psychological hardship, and psychic "stigma"
were used as legally significant factors in determining the boundaries of state action
and individual rights.
The cases from Lochner to Roe turned mainly on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but therapeutic ideals came to inform other areas of law as
well. Plyler v. Doe,132 like Brown, was an equal protection case, in which the children
of illegal immigrants challenged a Texas law that would have denied them public edu-
cation.'33 Striking down the law, the Court expressed its disapproval of "govern-
mental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of
individual merit.... [B]y depriving the children of any disfavored group of an edu-
cation, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in
which it is held by the majority."' 134 The therapeutic content of this passage is striking.
The therapeutic focus on individual fulfillment is nicely captured in the Court's concern
with "advancement on the basis of individual merit." The therapeutic emphasis on
good feeling and psychic well-being is shown by granting constitutional protection to
methods of increasing one's "esteem" in the eyes of others. To further its therapeutic
analysis, the Court drew on the same concern for psychological damage that it had
used in Brown: 'The inestimable toll of that deprivation [of education] on the social,
economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle
it imposes to individual achievement... [violate] the Equal Protection Clause.' 35
First Amendment law also felt the impact of therapeutic lawmaking. Roberts v.
United States Jaycees involved a Minnesota law that required a private, all-male civic
3 ' Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
132 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
133 Id. at 206.
114 Id. at 222.
135 Id.
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group to admit women as members. 36 At issue was whether the law unduly in-
fringed upon the members' First Amendment associational rights. 3 7 While the Court
upheld the statute, its explanation of associational rights offered a further example
of the therapeutic approach to rights law: "[lIndividuals draw much of their emotional
enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwar-
ranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty."' 38 The First Amendment, on this
view, protects more than free speech; it protects the pursuit of "emotional enrichment."
And constitutionally protected liberty consists of more than a lack of constraints on
behavior; it also includes the ability "to define one's identity." Constitutional law was
becoming ever more closely allied with the therapeutic project of self-fulfillment.
Therapeutic analysis also found a place in the religion cases with the advent of the
"endorsement test" in Establishment Clause law. This test first appeared in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case that upheld a town's placement
of a Christian nativity scene in a municipal holiday display. 139 In O'Connor's view,
state-sponsored religious displays should be measured to see whether they send a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. 140 Any such message should be
prohibited because of its effects on the psyches of the auditors: "Endorsement sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."
141
The endorsement test continued the Court's therapeutic project by making individ-
ual feelings (here, of belonging or alienation) a touchstone of civil rights law in the
religion cases, as well as in other contexts.
Another example in the Establishment Clause context is Lee v. Weisman, in
which the Court struck down a nonsectarian prayer offered at a high school graduation
ceremony.'42 The fatal flaw, as the Court saw it, was that the prayer required non-
believing students either to stand in apparent assent or to remain seated in obvious
136 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
117 Id. at 615.
"3' Id. at 619.
"9 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
140 Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'"' Id. at 688. This message-sending test has twice commanded a majority of the Court. See
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,309-10 (2000); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373,389-90 (1985) (finding that a program providing education to parochial students at public
expense in parochial schools could send a "message" of government approval of religion and
could confer a "significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some"). For other uses
of this test, see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,773-78 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 & n.9 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626-27 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 & n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
142 Lee, 505 U.S. 577.
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dissent.'43 Standing up might violate the students' principles, while remaining
seated might cause them to look conspicuous.' 44 This "dilemma," in turn, could cause
"embarrassment and .. .intrusion" for the student, thereby imposing a sense of
"offense," "isolation," and "affront" that rendered the prayer unconstitutional. 45
Where Barnette had prohibited the seeming coercion of political orthodoxy, Lee went
further: not only is the government forbidden to compel outward statements of belief,
but it is also barred from creating conditions that might cause psychic discomfort.
"[T]he Court's psycho-journey," as Justice Scalia labeled it in dissent,'46 emphasized
yet more strongly that therapeutic consequences could determine the boundaries of
state action.
Here we might pause to glance back at an analogous case from the nineteenth
century. In 1876, in Ferriter v. Tyler, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the ex-
pulsion of 150 Catholic children from public school for skipping class to attend church
on a Catholic feast day. 4' The plaintiffs claimed that this expulsion punished them
for their beliefs and therefore injured their right to freedom of conscience guaranteed
under the Vermont constitution. 48 But in typical nineteenth-century fashion, the court
was completely unsympathetic: "It would seem to be trifling with a momentous sub-
ject, to claim that [the constitution] was designed to prohibit the Legislature from
enacting any law... which might interfere with the wishes, and tastes, and feelings
of any of the citizens in the matter of religion."'4 9 The contrast to Lee could hardly be
more stark. In Ferriter, individual feeling was expressly rejected as a basis for in-
voking judicial power. In Lee, however, those feelings were the central reason why
the Court struck down the state's action. The difference graphically illustrates the
shift from the nineteenth century's anti-therapeutic approach to the twentieth-century
therapeutic ideal of rights.
The Court's therapeutic jurisprudence reached new heights several days after
Lee was decided in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 50
Ostensibly, Casey was about whether a state could regulate abortion by imposing re-
quirements of informed consent, parental notification, spousal notification, and record-
keeping. 5 ' But Casey was also a manifesto of the Court's vision of the therapeutic
role of law in American life. In the case's central therapeutic passage, the Court made
clear that it was dealing not only with discrete questions of abortion law, but also with
a grand therapeutic project:
141 Id. at 593.
144 id.
41 Id. at 593-94.
'" Id. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 48 Vt. 444 (1876).
148 Id.
,49 Id. at 465.
10 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'5' Id. at 844.
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At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.
These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's
152interest in terminating her pregnancy ....
This passage was the Court's most sweeping statement yet of the therapeutic project
of the law. Individual liberty under the Constitution encompasses not merely specific,
defined rights, such as the right to use contraception, to have an abortion, to educate
one's children, or to worship as one pleases, but also one's thoughts, one's feelings,
one's woridview, and one's approach to the mysteries of life and the universe. In
short, it encompasses one's very soul. As applied to the law before the Court, this
meant that the stakes were not merely bodily liberty, but one's unique cosmic pur-
poses: "The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own con-
ception of her spiritual imperatives... .""' A case that could technically have been
about the law of abortion and the application of precedent was transformed into a mani-
festo of personal fulfillment. The transformation of a legal problem into a spiritual
one showed that the therapeutic had triumphed in the law of individual rights.
A decade later the Court drew on Casey's therapeutic vision in Lawrence v. Texas,
striking down a state law criminalizing homosexual sodomy. 54 The Court took the
occasion again to affirm the therapeutic character of constitutional law: "Liberty pre-
sumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions."'55 In Lawrence, this "transcendent"
liberty again took the form of psychic fulfillment. According to the Court, the Texas
law was wrong not only because it infringed on private sexual conduct, but also be-
cause the regulation of such conduct meant that the state had impermissibly sought
to "demean [the plaintiffs'] existence or control their destiny." '56 Once again, the Court
relied on therapy to explain the content of constitutional law.
Many of these therapeutic decisions can be crudely classified as "liberal," favor-
ing individual rights over state action. But in its last term, the Court showed that the
therapeutic approach can be used by those on the other side of the aisle, as well. In
Gonzales v. Carhart, a conservative majority upheld Congress's ban of partial-birth
abortions.157 As part of its justification, the majority relied on the emotional impact
152 Id. at 851-52.
153 Id. at 852.
"' Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155 Id. at 562.
156 Id. at 578.
'' Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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of the banned procedures, imagining a woman who procured an abortion only to
learn later of the distasteful method used by her doctor to terminate the pregnancy.5 8
Congress, the Court said, had a legitimate interest in protecting women from the
psychic damage that such knowledge might bring:
It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning the
way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern
to the State. The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice
is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished
and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event,
what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn
child, a child assuming the human form. 59
Thus, the Court used a therapeutic rationale-protecting a "grave" choice and guarding
the woman from "grief," "anguish," and "sorrow"-to justify its decision.1" Gonzales
shows that the therapeutic approach to law has become an established method of
adjudication, not merely a vehicle for specific political views.
The Court's uses of therapy show how greatly the concept of rights has changed
since the nineteenth century. While in the nineteenth century the internal realm and
the realm of behavior were separate, now they are conflated. Restraints on behavior
have become equated with assaults on the spirit. The boundaries of individual liberty
and state power are set with reference to individual happiness and fulfillment rather
than older concepts of duty, civic virtue, or democratic power-sharing. 61 The Court
has come to review state action for its emotional, spiritual, and psychic effects, and
it will strike down laws that hinder self-concept or self-fulfillment. Thus, to require
the recitation of a pledge has become an incursion on the realm of "intellect and
spirit." 62 To expose a young adult to state-sponsored prayer is to expose her to
"offense," "isolation," and "affront."' 163 To restrict the obtaining of abortions is to
trample on one's "spiritual imperatives" and ability to ponder one's own concept of
"meaning" and "the mystery of human life."' 64 To restrict sexual behavior is to
"demean" one's very "existence" or to control one's "destiny."' 165 The demands of
158 Id. at 1634.
"9 Id. (citation omitted).
160 Id.
161 See supra Part I.
162 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
163 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
'64 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992).
165 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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internal self-fulfillment determine the boundaries of state action, and the therapeutic
has become a touchstone of constitutional law.
It is worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court may have led the way in
importing therapeutic concepts into civil rights, it has not been alone. It is a testament
to the ubiquity of the therapeutic culture that many state supreme courts have also
adopted therapeutic ideals in interpreting their own constitutions. An early, if slightly
offbeat, example was an Alaska case that recognized a privacy right to smoke mari-
j uana in one's home."6 The state supreme court relied expressly on concepts of self-
definition, with a local twist:
The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution was intended
to give recognition and protection to the home. Such a reading is
consonant with the character of life in Alaska. Our territory and
now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize
their individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue
living here in order to achieve a measure of control over their own
lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister
states. '67
Individual rights are determined here, as in the U.S. Supreme Court cases, with refer-
ence to the therapeutic concerns of "individuality" and one's preferred "lifestyle."
More conventionally, other states have applied therapeutic concepts in addressing
claims related to abortion, homosexual relationships, and sex discrimination, The
Supreme Court of California, for example, drew upon some of the same therapeutic
concepts expressed in Casey to strike down a law requiring a minor to obtain parental
consent or judicial permission before having an abortion.'68 "The right of choice,"
the plurality wrote, "also may implicate a woman's deepest philosophical, moral, and
religious concerns, including her personal beliefs regarding the meaning of human
existence and the beginning of human life."'169 This decision, implicating as it did
"personal bodily integrity" and the "ability to define and adhere to her ultimate values
regarding the meaning of human existence and life," was beyond the power of the state
to control. 7° The plurality noted that "the statute at issue in this case unquestionably
impinges upon an interest fundamental to personal autonomy."'' The New Jersey
Supreme Court, striking down a similar law, rested its decision on "a woman's right
to control her body and her future," as well as her personal "destiny."' 72 Six years
166 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
167 Id. at 503-04.
168 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (plurality opinion).
169 Id. at 813.
170 Id. at 816.
171 Id. at 818 (internal quotations omitted).
172 Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 621, 632 (N.J. 2000).
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later, the same court held that committed same-sex couples were entitled to the same
public benefits as heterosexual married couples. 173 As one basis for its decision, the
court pointed to the "social indignities" visited on homosexual couples by reason of
their different status under current law and held that the law as it stood thus breached
the values of "human dignity and autonomy."' 174 Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court has recognized a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the state con-
stitution, noting that marriage "is among life's momentous acts of self-definition,"
fulfilling "yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common
humanity."' 75 "Without the right to marry," the court commented, "one is excluded
from the full range of human experience"'76 and deprived "of access to an institution
of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance.' ' 177 In a case involving adultery,
the Virginia Supreme Court drew on the therapeutic ethic to strike down the state's
criminal fornication statute. 78 Citing Lawrence's concerns about the "demeaning"
of personal "existence" by restrictions on sexual behavior, the court concluded that
the state law "improperly abridge[s] a personal relationship that [is] within the liberty
interest of persons to choose."' 179 And in a case involving a challenge to a country
club's men-only dining room, the Louisiana Supreme Court struck down the policy,
branding it a deprivation of "personal dignity" that inflicts "stigmatizing injury" on
those denied access. 180
All of these cases show an unmistakable change in the law of rights in both the
state and federal courts. With individual well-being as the new barometer, the function
of rights law has become the fostering of personal happiness and psychic fulfillment.
The law of civil rights has become entwined with therapy.
I. LAW, THERAPY, AND DEPENDENCE
The "rights revolution," aided as we have seen by the therapeutic culture, has
ostensibly expanded individual freedoms. Persons, activities, and interests that once
were suppressed or punished now receive the full protection of law. We may justly
celebrate our age's commitment to liberty and the heightened protections brought
about by these court decisions. But the therapeutic approach to law is not an unquali-
fied blessing. The therapeutic culture has allowed government to exercise increasing
power in the name of therapy, and it has allowed law to annex to its empire the most
sacred domain of our inner selves. As a result, it has made possible new forms of
"' Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
114 Id. at 202, 217.
' Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003).
176 Id. at 957.
177 Id. at 958.
178 Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
179 Id. at 370.
180 Albright v. S. Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 879 So.2d 121, 124 (La. 2004).
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state control and contributed significantly to the proliferation of law in modem life.
While it would be alarmist to call the civil rights cases despotic, in the way that other
examples of therapeutic power threaten to be, they nonetheless bolster the assumption
that the inner lives of persons are a proper subject of state concern. They, and the rest
of the therapeutic state, therefore deserve our careful and critical examination.
As the therapeutic culture expands state power, it also threatens to diminish
individual autonomy by discouraging self-reliance and encouraging dependence on
therapeutic authority. It is a central premise of the therapeutic culture that the self is
weak and in need of healing. I8' This typically is accomplished through the guidance
of some authority outside the self: the doctor, the counselor, or the bureaucratic
expert. 8 2 To this list we may now add the courts, who are increasingly asked, and
are increasingly willing, to exercise therapeutic authority over diverse aspects of
American life. 83 Problems of inner disequilibrium may now be addressed by seeking
relief from the courts instead of using the more old-fashioned techniques of regulating
one's own feelings, developing skills of psychic self-reliance, or persuading one's
fellows that their offensive course of action is undesirable. We have created, in effect,
a welfare state of civil rights, in which government assumes responsibility for our
spiritual and psychic well-being as well as our material needs. Thus, while the thera-
peutic uses of law ostensibly expand individual liberty, they may also have the effect
of increasing state power at the expense of the self-reliance and personal autonomy
necessary for true democratic freedom.
A. Therapeutic Power and the Aggrandizement of Law
The introduction of therapeutic concepts to law has played a key role in what
I will call the aggrandizement of law, the American tendency to give law an ever-
increasing presence in national and personal life. To fully appreciate the contribution
of the therapeutic culture to this process, it may be helpful to sketch briefly the rise
of law in American society.
Law has always had a strong presence in American life. As early as 1776,
Thomas Paine could declare that "in America the law is king.' 84 Constitutionalism
was a hallmark of the early Republic, and robust government regulation of commerce,
public safety, and other matters was commonplace from at least the early nineteenth
century.' But nineteenth-century culture also imposed limits on law. As I have
l8 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
t82 See supra notes 53-55, 66-72 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
114 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in COMMON SENSE, THE RIGHTS
OF MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRrrINGS OFTHOMAS PAINE 23,49 (Sidney Hooked., NAL
Penguin 1984) (emphasis omitted).
185 See generally NOVAK, supra note 13 (discussing government regulation in nineteenth-
century America).
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explained previously, the nineteenth-century courts were largely unwilling to extend
their power to civil rights claims based on states of feeling or belief. 186 The Protestant
culture presumed that the individual was morally capable and morally autonomous,
which meant that he could regulate his own internal state regardless of how govern-
ment might require him to behave. 8 7 For the blasphemer punished as a criminal, the
non-believing schoolchild forced to pray, or the Jewish shopkeeper required to close
on Sunday, most courts had the same answer: no one has prevented your believing
what you wish; it is merely your actions that are constrained.' 88 This was, in a sense,
an anti-therapeutic state, premised on the notion that law was limited in what it could
be expected to do, while the individual, in his inner space of conscience, belief, and
self, was not. 189 Thus, as James Willard Hurst points out, for much of the nineteenth
century, law was used primarily to govern what might be called "external" matters,
such as the economy, trade, or the taming of the natural environment.' 9° It generally
was not involved with the internal states of individuals.
But this limited view of law was not to last. As discussed above, the decline of
older moral paradigms, and the increasing diversity of the American nation, left a
vacuum to be filled by other sources of shared meaning.' 9' One of these, we have
seen, was the therapeutic culture. Another was law. Like the therapeutic culture, and
unlike the older cultural paradigms, law offers a system of meaning that is capable
of satisfying the diverse members of the modern American state. In America the law
is famously declared to be no respecter of persons; it is not Catholic, not Protestant,
not Irish nor Jewish nor WASP. Mary Ann Glendon notes that "[w]ith increasing
heterogeneity, it has become quite difficult to convincingly articulate common values
by reference to a shared history, religion, or cultural tradition."'' 92 This accounts for
"our increasing tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of the few values
that are widely shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice under
law."' 93 Similarly, Lawrence Friedman attributes the rise of law to the decline of the
older sources of authority that it replaces: the "expansion" and "ubiquity" of law have
brought about a society in which "[n]othing is nonjusticiable" and in which "law
appears to be a kind of replacement, a substitute for traditional authority."' 94 Law,
186 See Piar, supra note 27.
187 See NOLAN, supra note 7, at 34-36.
18' See id. at 988.
189 id.
'90 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 39, 84-85 (1956).
'9' See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
192 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 3; see also PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF
LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 9 (1999) ("Without a common ethnic, racial,
or religious heritage, American identity is peculiarly dependent on the idea of law.").
'9' GLENDON, supra note 2, at 3.
194 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 16-17; see also KAGAN, supra note 3, at 37-40. For
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like the therapeutic ethic, has proven to be one of the few systems of meaning that
can attain universal currency in an increasingly diverse nation.
While Americans were becoming more enamored of law, they were also demand-
ing progressively more state action. The growth of the regulatory welfare state that
began in the nineteenth century was accelerated by the penury of the Great Depression
and, despite occasional calls for its curtailment, shows no real signs of stopping.1 95
As Calvin Woodard wrote in the early 1960s, "[W]e all take for granted so much
governmental action that Sir William Harcourt's famous comment... that 'we are all
socialists now'-is far truer today than it was when he spoke."'196 American govern-
ment has expanded at an ever-increasing rate, with more spending, more programs,
and of course more regulation.' 97 The law has kept pace with this growth and the
expectations that it fosters. The story of the Supreme Court's 1937 "switch in time"
is an oft-told one and may be the most vivid example of older legal notions of
limited government yielding to the new realities.
The growth of law in the regulatory state was paralleled by the growth of rights
law. Civil rights litigation in the nineteenth century had largely taken place in the state
courts, but by the dawn of the twentieth century, the shift to the federal courts was
well under way. Despite some initial stumblings, such as the Slaughter-House Cases 98
and the Civil Rights Cases,'99 the Fourteenth Amendment soon gave the federal courts
a wide-ranging power of review over the activities of the states. Evolving concepts of
equal protection and substantive due process encouraged the Supreme Court to exer-
cise that power more and more frequently.2" This consolidation of federal authority
made it easier for the Court to push the law in directions dictated by its own will or
by the demands of the culture. By the late twentieth century it seemed that very little
lay beyond law's reach, from the most minute details of trade and commerce to the
another sustained look at the cultural demand for law, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL
JUSTICE (1985).
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1231,
1236-37 (1994); see also THEODORE CAPLOW, AMERICAN SOCIAL TRENDS 107-12 (1991);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 79-80; KAGAN, supra note 3, at 181-82; WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at 61, 331-35
(1963); NOLAN, supra note 7, at 38-40.
196 Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the
Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286, 323 (1962).
197 CAPLOW, supra note 195, at 107-12; NOLAN, supra note 7, at 38-40.
198 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
'99 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
200 Historian John Semonche reports that from the beginning of Fourteenth Amendment
litigation in the 1870s to 1921, the Supreme Court overturned state laws in "less than seven
percent" of due process cases. From 1921 through 1926, the rate climbed to twenty-eight
percent. JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO
A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 424-25 (1978); see also GLENDON, supra note 2, at
4-5 (explaining that the Court in the 1960s began to vigorously expand individual rights).
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largest questions "of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."' '
This aggrandizement of law has been aided significantly by the rise of the
therapeutic culture, which has opened yet another avenue for state expansion. In his
landmark study of nineteenth-century law, Hurst observed that law moved from regu-
lation of the natural and social environments to regulation of the "individual's internal
environment."' ' 2 Consequently, he wrote, "[W]e began to use law with growing
consciousness of a need to meet the challenge of the personal environment, set by
individuals' emotional response to circumstance."2 3 Even though Hurst was not
focused on the therapeutic culture directly, his insights about the inward movement of
law and state power accurately describe the therapeutic aggrandizement of law. The
modern state concerns itself "not only with behavior but with the internal workings
of individuals," which enables it to "expand itself still further into the private lives of
its citizens. '  With the rise of the therapeutic, law now regulates not only the external
environment, but also our internal environment-"the sphere of intellect and spirit"
identified in Barnette2' and "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" identified in Casey. °6
This union of law and therapy has yielded new forms of legal power and con-
trol. A "normalizing intervention"2 7 in people's lives has become an accepted state
activity, as the emotional states of individuals have become "not simply a personal
matter, but a legitimate subject for public concern." 208 One consequence of this is what
James Nolan calls "therapeutic coercion," whereby the state insists on the achieve-
ment of certain psychic states as part of its rule. 2 9 Examples include alcoholism
treatments for drunk-driving offenders, whether or not they are actually alcoholics;
the conditioning of criminal parole on the achievement of certain approved psycho-
logical insights; state-required workplace sensitivity training in both the public and
private sectors; the expansive state supervision imposed on drug offenders in thera-
peutically oriented drug courts; and public schools' insistence that some children be
medicated even over the objections of their parents.2 10 Criminal defendants are often
forced in the name of therapy to confess to addictions or pathologies they do not
believe they have, while participants in workforce sensitivity training are urged to
acknowledge antisocial feelings that they may not share in order to demonstrate that
201 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
202 HURST, supra note 190, at 39.
203 Id. at 85.
204 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 292.
205 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
206 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
207 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 80.
208 FUREDI, supra note 35, at 198.
209 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 292.
210 Id. at 150, 292-97; see also FUREDI, supra note 35, at 199.
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they are being "fixed. 2 1' In the prison system, therapeutic concepts of rehabilitation
and treatment are used to justify the indefinite detention of insanity acquittees or
those convicted of crimes until the state deems them healed.2 12 In the welfare system,
Andrew Polsky has detailed the proscriptive tendencies of various public aid pro-
grams, in which the subjects of state-sponsored therapy "find their most intimate be-
havior a matter of official concern and regulation., 213 They are frequently "obliged
to reveal their disreputable behaviors and personal weaknesses, and then... required
to conform to any standard of conduct public caseworkers and probation officers might
establish. ,21 4 Recipients of government aid "have faced demands that they change
how they rear their children, adopt different spending habits, find a new residence,
maintain sexual abstinence, and more; refusal to comply can mean the breakup of
a family or incarceration. 2 5 Therapeutic goals thus provide innumerable occasions
for the exercise of state power and expand the scope of legal control.
The modem civil rights cases are an important part of the therapeutic aggrandize-
ment of law. Unlike the more reticent nineteenth-century courts, the Supreme Court
now appears to be willing, if not eager, to bring law to bear on the internal problems
of the individual. State action that causes bad feeling, emotional injury, or existential
harm has become forbidden.2 16 The Constitution, it seems, has something to say about
our psychic states as well as our social and economic interrelations. What was once
a significant limitation on law-its unsuitability for solving the individual's internal
problems-has fallen away, and law's empire has annexed yet another territory.
It is true that the rights cases do not at first glance look like the most sinister mani-
festations of the therapeutic state. Their ostensible intent has been to expand personal
freedom, not to tell people how to think or feel. Nonetheless, beneath this surface
gentility lies a very tangible form of state control. As some have observed, law is
inherently coercive.217 By its nature it commands obedience, and by definition it pre-
supposes the use of state-sanctioned force to uphold its rule.218 H. Jefferson Powell
has gone so far as to declare that "constitutionalism is one of the most seductive masks
211 NOLAN, supra note 7, at 292-97; see also PoLSKY, supra note 14, at 16, 81-82.
212 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (upholding the indefinite commit-
ment of insanity acquittees); Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold
Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1.
213 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 82; see also id. at 6, 16, 81-84 (arguing that state-sponsored
therapy facilitates intrusion into subjects' personal lives).
214 Id. at 82.
215 Id. at 16.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
217 See, e.g., GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 135 (1978).
218 See id. For a more extreme view, see Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALEL.J. 1601 (1986) (arguing that judicial interpretation must be understood in the context
of the violence occasioned by interpretive acts).
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worn by state violence., 21 9 Some of this talk can sound slightly hyperbolic; after all,
the Supreme Court has yet to call out the troops. But there is also truth in the idea that
even constitutional cases, in which the courts speak in terms of rights, aspirations, and
ideals, have winners and losers. There is always someone on the short end of a
decision who must obey or risk consequences. This authority--or violence, if one is
so inclined-now finds further justification in the name of therapy. The courts rou-
tinely dictate to other state actors what they may and may not do based on judicial
views of what therapy requires. And much state action, it should be remembered,
expresses not the will of some faceless machine, but the desires of political majorities
to order their communities in ways that may accord with their own concepts of self.
Therapeutic claims now provide an occasion for litigants to invoke judicial power and
to trump these majority interests if they can convince a therapeutically inclined court
that their internal demands should be met. Thus, the courts have come to sit as thera-
peutic censors of state action, approving some political encounters and disapproving
others, depending on their therapeutic implications. Powell may overstate the case for
law as violence, but he is right to see that the seductive appeal of therapeutic adjudi-
cation is merely another guise for the same old exercise of judicial authority. Power
is still power, even when it cloaks itself in the softened tones "of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."22 In fact, it is power aggrandized,
because it has found a new, and to some, more appealing basis on which to expand
its reach.
In this way, the civil rights cases go well beyond the resolution of specific
disputes to reinforce the therapeutic state in all its guises. By linking the content of
law to therapeutic ideals, the cases reinforce the premise that individual emotions,
feelings, and fulfillment are proper subjects of state concern. If the Supreme Court
may link the therapeutic to the law, then why should the drug court, the welfare
bureaucrat, the parole officer, or any other state actor not do the same? These cases
thereby legitimize the wider apparatus of therapeutic power and in so doing contribute
significantly to the expansive reach of law in our time.
B. Therapy, Dependence, and Conformity
As the therapeutic culture expands the reach of legal power, it also presents a
second, related threat to liberty: the decline of personal autonomy in favor of de-
pendence on therapeutic authority. While the therapeutic ethic is ostensibly dedicated
to human fulfillment, it proceeds from a view of human nature that can be more en-
feebling than empowering. As Robert Bellah points out, "The very term therapeutic
219 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONST1TUTIONALISM:
A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 47 (1993).
220 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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suggests a life focused on the need for cure., 22' The healthy, after all, do not need
therapy, and so the therapeutic culture presumes that we are in some sense ill. 222 It
then seeks to remedy this weakness through the administration of therapy. Writing on
the welfare state's treatment of the poor and dispossessed, Andrew Polsky notes that
"public therapeutic intervention aimed at marginal citizens proceeds from the assump-
tion that they cannot govern their own lives. The state therefore seeks to 'normalize'
them. '223 Christopher Lasch, remarking on the medical-therapeutic state, points out
that "[t]herapy legitimates deviance as sickness, but it simultaneously pronounces the
patient unfit to manage his own life and delivers him into the hands of a specialist.
224
Even the more sanguine of observers have noted that the therapeutic urge proceeds,
if not from clinical maladies, then from the desire for a happiness not readily attained
in a complex, unstable world.225 The therapeutic ethic thus "posits the self in distinctly
fragile and feeble form and insists that the management of life requires the continuous
intervention of therapeutic expertise. ' '226
This expertise is provided through the ministrations of therapeutic authority. But
while the promise of healing may sound benevolent, its delivery can be more prob-
lematic. The doctor is therapy's original authority figure, but, as Bellah notes, the
doctor-patient relationship, especially in the mental health field, is "tightly regulated
and carefully balanced. 227 The paradigmatic image is that of the psychiatrist tersely
saying, "our time is up," doling out treatment in fifty-minute increments in a relation-
ship where certain kinds of intimacy are strictly proscribed, and there is no question
who is in charge.228 In the wider therapeutic culture, authority figures include bureau-
crats, counselors, teachers, judges, and everyone else charged with administering the
therapeutic apparatus at all its levels.229 At times, as we have seen, this authority can
be coercive. In other settings therapy is sought voluntarily, but even then surrender
to authority is part of the program. Millions of people turn to the medical establish-
ment and its drugs for the professional management of their emotions.23' Others hang
221 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 35, at 47.
222 See generally FUREDI, supra note 35 (arguing that the therapeutic imperative promotes
self-limitation and constant therapeutic intervention); LASCH, supra note 41 (arguing that the
therapeutic sensibility is pervasive in contemporary life); POLSKY, supra note 14 (arguing that
public therapeutic intervention assumes marginal citizens cannot manage their own lives).
223 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 4.
224 LASCH, supra note 41, at 231.
225 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 192; FUREDI, supra note 35, at 4-8; MOSKOWTrz,
supra note 16, at 2-3.
226 FUREDI, supra note 35, at 21; see also id. at 106-26 (arguing that therapeutic culture
presupposes a fundamentally vulnerable self that depends on therapeutics for its realization).
227 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 35, at 127.
228 See id. at 123-24.
229 See supra text accompanying note 66.
230 See supra Part III.A.
231 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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on the words of self-help gurus from Oprah to Dr. Phil.232 The therapeutic culture pro-
motes the "professionalisation of everyday life,, 23 3 in which informal, organic sources
of guidance such as family, friends, and neighbors have been steadily replaced by the
therapist, the social worker, the bureaucrat, the doctor, and the professional helper.23
The therapeutic state thus "renders people's self-identity dependent on professionals
and institutions. '235 It has sanctioned the "disorganisation of the private sphere" in
favor of professional control.236 It "has replaced personal dependence not with bureau-
cratic rationality... but with a new form of bureaucratic dependence. ' 237 In this sense,
therapy creates new authorities to replace the old. Whether state-sponsored or self-
initiated, "[t]he institutionalisation of the therapeutic ethos can also be interpreted
as the constitution of a regime of social control." 231 The therapeutic culture, far from
fostering self-reliance, in fact encourages the surrender of personal autonomy to
therapeutic authority.
One might think that the therapeutic emphasis on self-fulfillment would encour-
age diversity, but, in a further irony, therapeutic authority frequently seeks to impose
conformity as part of its normalizing project. Whether on the doctor's couch or in the
wider therapeutic state, therapy frequently requires that certain behaviors, feelings,
or thoughts be suppressed. Frank Furedi explains:
The distinguishing feature of therapeutic culture is not an open-
ness towards emotions, but the unusual interest it takes in the
management of people's internal life. It transforms the private
feelings of people into a subject matter for public policy-making
and cultural concern. But at the same time it adopts a selective
attitude towards what emotions can and what emotions cannot
be displayed. The cultivation of certain emotional attitudes and
the repression of others is systematically pursued by institutions
and professionals devoted to the management of how people
ought to feel.239
Polsky likewise notes that the social-welfare programs of the therapeutic state rou-
tinely demand conformity to models of feeling or behavior deemed appropriate by
officials.24 In this way, "[t]he modem self s expressive freedom goes hand in hand
232 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
233 FUREDI, supra note 35, at 98.
234 See id. at 98-99.
235 Id. at 174.
236 Id. at 103; see also LASCH, supra note 41, at 218.
237 LASCH, supra note 41, at 229.
238 FUREDI, supra note 35, at 199.
239 Id. at 197.
240 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 16, 81-82.
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with the modem world's instrumental control., 241 The therapeutic ideal begins with
freedom, but through a subtle sleight of hand frequently ends with authority, con-
formity, and oversight.
These observations also hold true for the therapeutic approach to law. Here, too,
the contrast to earlier legal culture is instructive. In the nineteenth century, the law
tended to view human capacity more generously than it does today.242 A central prem-
ise of the Protestant legal culture was individual moral autonomy: because people
were strong enough to fend for themselves, whether in a spiritual or a political sense,
law was given a secondary role in defining and enforcing individual liberty.243 In other
words, nineteenth-century culture could limit the role of law because it believed
individuals to be strong enough to control their own feelings, or their own destinies,
without the aid of the courts. But the modem view, in which courts have become the
guardians of psychic well-being, suggests that the law is no longer willing to give the
individual so much credit. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey provides a prime example.2 " In a passage on the abortion right, the majority
wrote, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."245 This sounds like an
empowering statement until one reads the next sentence: "Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State. 246 In one breath, the Court assumed that humans have the capacity to
determine meaning and lend content to their own lives. But in the next, it presumed
that a law regulating behavior-the terms on which one may obtain an abortion-
will forcibly change one's beliefs about the questions of the self. The Court seems
to have assumed that beliefs about one's self are so fragile that they must be protected
from the corrosive influence of contrary government policies. Thus, in Casey, a limit
on the availability of abortion became an attack on a person' s entire concept of life
and self. In Lee v. Weisman, exposure to school prayer inflicted emotional wounds
sufficient to justify constitutional intervention.24 7 In Plyler v. Doe, obstacles to gaining
the "esteem" of one's fellow citizens were deemed illegal.248 In the endorsement test
cases, public displays of religion hurt feelings in ways that required the judicial power
of the United States to prevent. 249 Nowhere in these cases does one find the idea that
individuals can transcend these bumps and bruises of everyday life; instead, people
must be kept safe from even the most mild emotional upset. The tone and content of
241 BELLAH ET AL., supra note 35, at 124.
242 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
243 See Piar, supra note 27.
244 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
245 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
246 Id.
247 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); see supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
248 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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modern therapeutic adjudication send the message that the courts are guarding weak
and fragile persons not the robust, self-reliant individuals of an earlier culture.
If the courts are unwilling to give the individual much credit for personal
autonomy, individuals in turn seem willing to accept this condescension and to depend
on courts for the vindication of their emotional interests. In this, they partake of the
system of dependence and control that characterizes the therapeutic state in so many
of its aspects. Increasingly, problems of individual emotion and response to circum-
stance are being addressed by the courts, not by autonomous individuals in the harbor
of their own minds and hearts. Increasingly, the great social questions of our time are
being determined by judges based on their ideas of what a therapeutic culture requires,
not by individuals acting in political bodies. If someone feels aggrieved by state
action, whether an abortion restriction, a prayer, or some other psychically troubling
event, it is no longer necessary for that person to convince his fellow citizens of his
position or to resolve any emotional fallout in the confines of his own self. Instead,
he can seek relief by going to the courts, who are now the guardians of his psychic
well-being as well as his physical freedoms.
This process risks the atrophy of the individual's powers of self-determination.
Why cultivate emotional self-reliance when you can count on a court to force others
to behave in ways that will not hurt you? Why develop political skill or build com-
munity consensus when you know that a court will shortcut the political process in
the name of therapy? The legal-therapeutic state threatens to "obliterate the indigenous
aspirations that form the basis for all real political self-determination,"25 turning citi-
zens into perpetual petitioners instead of political and emotional actors. The citizen
becomes a passive recipient of legal charity rather than an active shaper of his own
thoughts, feelings, and self.251
As in the therapeutic culture more generally, the therapeutic use of law also exacts
a cost in conformity. Like the doctor encouraging "right" thoughts and discouraging
"wrong" ones, the courts use therapeutic ideals to police the line between "right" and
"wrong" state actions. By this process, therapeutic rulings are imposed on entire states
or on the entire nation, even in settings where reasonable persons might differ, where
the state action under review represents a democratic compromise, or where individuals
might be able to make their own choices without the paternalistic guidance of the
250 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 84.
251 See id. at 128-29. This problem has not been lost on some members of the Supreme
Court. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 254 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]hen this Court rushes in to
remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes
of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise consti-
tutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to
atrophy."). The atrophying process about which Burger is concerned is the same for the psychic
faculties as it is for the political faculties.
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courts. Political communities are no longer free to govern themselves if that govern-
ment runs afoul of court-approved therapeutic ideals. Increasingly, in the words of
H. Jefferson Powell, "the central moral commitment of constitutionalism" is "the
'protection' of the atomistic individual from moral involvement with anyone other
than the omnipresent state,"252 or at least with anyone who offers the kinds of inter-
actions of which the therapeutic courts disapprove. 3 We thus have established a kind
of emotional welfare state, in which we look to the central government to provide
for our psychic well-being as well as our material security.
CONCLUSION: THE KINDLY APOCALYPSE
"I am aware that these speculations may be thought to contain some parodies of
an apocalypse. But what apocalypse has ever been so kindly? What culture has ever
attempted to see to it that no ego is hurt?" 254
The triumph of the therapeutic in American constitutional law may accelerate
the kindly apocalypse predicted by Rieff. If therapy were merely a matter of the
one-on-one of the psychiatrist's couch, or even the domain of a few large but limited
bureaucratic programs, the reach of the therapeutic ethic might be rather small. But
when therapy is wedded to law, it attains a power orders of magnitude greater than
before. In a nation as devoted to constitutionalism as the United States, the constitu-
tional courts wield vast influence. And when the therapeutic culture determines the
meaning of the Constitution, we in effect become ruled by therapy. It is a phenomenon
unique to our age that the constitutional courts shape law to safeguard individual feel-
ings and psychic well-being. Never before has the content of our nation's supreme
law been dictated by the demands of therapy--or, to be more precise, five lawyers'
views of what therapy requires. If there is some absurdity in this, it is only a measure
of how strongly the therapeutic culture has taken hold, that we are willing to rely on
its principles even in the very temple of reason. Further, it appears that we are willing
in the process to risk our powers of self-determination by ceding them to courts, who,
we expect, administer the therapy that we seem to crave. If we congratulate ourselves
on achieving a state in which rights are expanded, we should not forget that thera-
peutic power is still power and, like all power, is difficult to take back once given away.
252 POWELL, supra note 219, at 263 n.14.
253 In addition to the cases discussed above, see generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL
POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 103-21
(1994) ("[I]n pursuing our own moral visions, we necessarily attempt to inflict on others the
very types of control that we tend to think would be illegitimate if inflicted on us."). Nagel's
thesis, which has something in common with my own, is that American culture has allowed
the courts to expand their power in the name of self-censorship, out of fear of the conflicts and
imperfections inherent in the political process. See id. at 3-7.
254 RiEFF, supra note 32, at 27.
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In the glow of Brown255 it is easy to forget the lessons of Dred Scott v. Sandford256 and
Korematsu v. United States.257 Nor should we forget the special dangers of depen-
dence and control that the therapeutic culture brings. Andrew Polsky's warning
about therapeutic bureaucracy rings equally true for therapeutic adjudication:
[O]ur reliance on the therapeutic approach slowly erodes the
foundations for democratic citizenship. Personal autonomy,
however flawed, is a prerequisite for membership in a democratic
political community.... [I]ntervention often leads not to self-
sufficiency but rather to ongoing surveillance and further episodes
of tutelage. Marginal populations lose the space in which to define
their problems in their own terms, one of the basic conditions for
democratic politics.
2 58
By endowing the law with therapeutic authority, we risk becoming the emotional
and psychic wards of the courts rather than contributors to our own destinies. The
seductive promise of constitutional freedom may turn out to be nothing more than
a welfare state of civil rights.
255 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see supra notes 115-26 and accom-
panying text.
256 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
257 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
258 POLSKY, supra note 14, at 217.
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